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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines density reduction as an alternative to weight or size 
reduction when decision makers seek options for lower-cost submarine designs.  The 
parameter density measures how tightly systems and equipment are placed within a hull 
structure.  To address design characteristics unique to submarines, this research focuses 
mainly on submarine design and procurement—although the general concepts are 
applicable to surface ship designs and may be applied more broadly.  Based on an 
examination of density as it relates to cost, this research indicates that: (1) the use of 
weight-reduction policies as a means to reduce cost have often generated the opposite 
effect; (2) increased cost schedule and performance risk and an improper mix of design 
capability and flexibility are the inevitable outcomes of unnecessarily dense designs; and 
(3) Arc-permeability and Internal Density, measures developed for this research, are 
sufficient approximations of how tightly systems and equipment are placed within a 
compartment.  Indeed, they may reveal how density represents a significant and 
previously underemphasized, if not unexplained, driver of historic submarine cost-growth 
in excess of inflation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to reveal the inadequacies of weight as a parametric 
cost estimator in modern U.S. Naval submarine design and procurement.  Density 
reduction is examined as an alternative to weight or size reduction when decision makers 
seek options for lower-cost submarine designs.  To address the unique issues associated 
with submarine density, the main focus of this research is on submarine design and 
procurement—although the general concepts are applicable to surface ship designs and 
may be applied more broadly.  If a positive correlation between submarine density and 
cost can be found, it is conceivable that a larger, less dense submarine could be designed 
and built more affordably than a smaller, more complex design. 
B. PROBLEM 
Roy Burcher and Louis Rydill, in their book Concepts in Submarine Design 
(1994) explain, “There is a temptation to speculate whether submarines would be cheaper 
to build if they were made larger and less congested, but although the instincts of many 
who have been involved in design and building submarines lead them to believe that 
could be so, it is difficult to prove or demonstrate” (p. 226).   
 The primary difficulty to date in demonstrating a relationship between density and 
cost in submarines has been a lack of analogous submarine designs capable of generating 
the necessary data to underpin a statistical cost comparison.  Now, a sufficient number of 
modern submarine designs exist with cost and design data in sufficient detail for 






The researcher selected six U.S. Naval submarine designs (for reasons explained 
in Chapter III) to investigate the notion that density may be acting as a cost driver in 
naval submarine design and procurement.  The submarine designs selected are: 
 USS Sturgeon (SSN 637) 
 USS George Washington (SSBN 598) 
 USS Ohio (SSBN 726) 
 USS Los Angeles (SSN 688) 
 USS Seawolf (SSN 21) 
 USS Virginia (SSN 774) 
Cooperation, assistance and data were provided by designers, cost estimators, engineers 
and acquisition professionals at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Cost 
Engineering & Industrial Analysis (05C) and Submarine Advanced Concepts Division 
(05U), Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), Program Executive Office (PEO) for 
Submarines, Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), General Dynamics’ Electric Boat 
(GD/EB) and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).  To preserve the non-
proprietary nature of this research, the results are presented such that actual values of 
sensitive information are masked. 
Many recent ship and submarine design decisions have been made on the 
assumption that cost per unit weight is fixed and that the cost of future designs will align 
with historic trends without adjustments for variations in design complexity or 
congestion.    This assumption has led to the treatment of weight as an independent 
variable and its management as an indirect means to manage cost.  This research will 
attempt to reveal that cost per unit weight can vary with a vessel’s complexity—of which 







By breaking this direct link between weight and cost, this research would lay the 
foundation for several innovations in submarine acquisition, to include the following: 
1. Contribute to conversations about the correct mix of capability and flexibility 
in a design by allowing informed decisions to be made regarding the space 
required and the cost to incorporate design flexibility, modularity, 
maintainability, reliability and life cycle cost-efficiency into future submarine 
designs. 
2. Highlight the importance of a deliberate and carefully guarded acquisition 
strategy and provide a means to reconcile seemingly contradictory strategic 
design goals. 
3. Enable an opportunity for meaningful comparisons of naval ship and 
submarine designs of various types, sizes and levels of complexity. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the purpose of the 
study.  It also highlights some problems that have previously prevented a thorough 
investigation of a potential relationship between density and cost in submarine design and 
procurement.  The subsequent three chapters discuss background information, research 
methodology and research results.  Chapter V provides a summary of findings, 
conclusions and recommendations. 
1.   Chapter II—Background 
The information for this chapter was gathered by way of a literature review and 
interviews with experts in the fields of submarine costing, design and procurement.  In 
all, 54 interviews were conducted with individuals affiliated with the following 
organizations: 
 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Washington, DC 
 Congressional Research Service (CRS), Washington, DC 
 Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), Arlington, VA 
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 General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB), Groton, CT 
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA 
 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA 
 Naval Reactors (NAVSEA 08), Washington, DC 
 Naval Sea Systems Command Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis 
(NAVSEA 05C), Washington, DC 
 Naval Sea Systems Command Submarine Design and System Engineering 
(NAVSEA 05U), Washington, DC 
 Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB), Newport News, VA  
 RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA 
 Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), Arlington, VA 
 Program Executive Office (PEO) for Submarines, Washington, DC 
A standardized list of interview questions was used to facilitate discussions, although 
other topics were discussed consistent with the interviewees’ area of expertise and past 
experience.  The standardized interview questions are provided in Appendix A.  
Chapter II begins by discussing submarine sizing considerations.  A comparison 
of an arrangement- versus a weight-driven design is provided.  The submarine sizing 
considerations section closes with an overview of some strategies for weight and size 
management during the submarine design process.   
A section on the advantages and disadvantages of weight-based cost estimates 
follows.  The latter portion of this section reveals the need for a parameter that not only 
speaks to the size of a submarine design, but one that reveals how tightly systems and 
equipment have been placed within the structure.  This section forms the theoretical basis 
for density as a cost driver.   
The final section in Chapter II discusses the potential benefits of realizing the 
effects of density on cost. It contends that the right mix of capability and flexibility, a 
congruent acquisition strategy and a means to compare vessels of differing types, sizes 
 5
and levels of complexity by way of compensated gross tons (cgt) are all possible when 
the negative effects density can exert on cost are known and factored into the decision-
making process. 
2.   Chapter III—Methodology 
The Methodology Chapter describes the process by which data were gathered, 
normalized and used to investigate potential relationships between density and cost.  The 
cost and hours data were provided by NAVSEA 05C.  The design data were provided by 
NAVSEA 05U and GD/EB.  Actual values have been masked to protect the sensitive 
nature of much of the data used. 
3.   Chapter IV—Results 
The Results Chapter presents the three cost segments (Shipbuilder, Government-
furnished Equipment (GFE) and End-cost less Other) and the two labor segments 
(Detailed Design hours and Production hours) plotted against the two density 
measurements (Internal Density and Arc-permeability)—for a total of ten plots.  The 
curvilinear lines superimposed on the plots are notional.  They are intended to show how 
the data relate to the theoretical relationship of density and cost.  
4.   Chapter V—Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter V opens with a summary of findings.  Next, the Conclusions Section 
suggests some possible applications of the findings for five groups or individuals 
responsible for various aspects of submarine design and procurement.  Finally, the 
Recommendations Section proposes areas where the theory and potential applications of 
the theory could benefit from additional research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. SUBMARINE SIZING CONSIDERATIONS 
Explanations of the hidden complexities encountered when making submarine 
sizing decisions have been recorded in works by Jackson (1992, 1998), Burcher and 
Rydill (1994), Arentzen and Mandel (1960) and others.  For example, according to 
Jackson: 
The volume of the hull of the submarine is fixed by the weight of the 
submarine.  If more volume is mandatory, it can only be provided by 
making the submarine larger, but this will increase the amount of lead to 
be carried and reduce the speed if the same power is provided.  If the 
power is increased in order to meet the speed requirements, the submarine 
will grow even larger.  The skill and experience of the designer is put to a 
crucial test in making a satisfactory design. (1998, p. 11)  
This quote only begins to reveal the interdependent nature of the many decisions that are 
made during submarine concept development and design phases; it serves to emphasize 
the need to strike a balance between size and capability. 
It is not the goal of this research to comprehensively describe the many and varied 
interactions between space and weight that have been documented in the above 
mentioned and other works; rather, the submarine sizing considerations recounted here 
serve to reveal the following: 
 Initial submarine sizing decisions are a leading determinant of the ultimate life 
cycle cost of a submarine, and the cost risk associated with undercalling the 
required volume is disproportionately high. 
 Constraints placed on the overall size or weight of a submarine design as a means 
to reduce procurement costs will tend to produce the opposite effect, while 
encouraging behavior that can lead to reductions in design flexibility, 
maintainability and reliability. 
 More space than has traditionally been made available is required as submarine 
designs incorporate modular construction techniques, open systems architecture 
and commercial off-the-shelf products. 
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In the words of Burcher and Rydill:  
Other things being equal, a smaller submarine with the same capability as 
a larger one should have the operational edge; and there is a temptation to 
believe that it would be cheaper to build and operate.  If correct these 
would be benefits, so why do we qualify with the phrase “other things 
being equal”?  The reason is that a submarine is palpably the most dense 
and complex of marine vehicles, and this is reflected by the high labour 
costs involved in fitting them out under very confined conditions; to go 
further in squeezing up on the contents could become counterproductive 
and almost certainly push up building costs rather than reduce them, as 
well as making maintenance in service and the work of refitting more 
difficult and probably more costly […] The aim is not to produce the 
smallest possible submarine for the allotted tasks, but one which 
represents a good compromise between operational effectiveness and least 
through life cost overall; that then is the size determinant. (Burcher & 
Rydill, 1994, p. 67) 
1. Arrangement- vs. Weight-driven Designs 
As previously mentioned, submarines are the densest of all marine vehicles 
(Burcher & Rydill, 1994).  In fact, it is their density that allows them to perform their 
most fundamental function—submerged operation.  On the surface, submarines achieve a 
density less than that of water by filling the submarine Main Ballast Tanks (MBT) with 
air, thus creating a Reserve of Buoyancy (ROB).  In order to submerge, the submarine 
allows the MBTs to fill with water, eliminating the buoyancy reserve.  This satisfies 
Archimedes’ Principle, which states that the weight of a displaced fluid is directly 
proportional to the volume of that displaced fluid (Heath, 1897). Thus, for a submarine to 
operate fully submerged, it must be capable of achieving a density equal to that of the 
fluid in which it intends to operate. 
Nominally, the submarine hull and structural components contribute nearly half of 
the weight required to achieve the submergence weight for a given submarine volume.  
The remaining weight is contributed by the various systems, equipment and ballast 
attached to or installed within the submarine hull. The significant contribution to the 
required submergence weight by the submarine hull and structural components is driven 
largely by the following two factors:   
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 The hull weight is the natural outcome of the need to withstand the extreme 
hydrostatic forces experienced at the maximum design operating depths.  
 Due to the relatively low density of installed systems and equipment, the dense 
hull brings the density of the overall design into balance. 
Therefore, when considering the ultimate size of a submarine design, designers exert 
considerable effort in achieving harmony between the submarine hull structure and its 
contents. 
The relationship between a submarine hull structure and its contents will 
generally fall into one of two broad categories: arrangement-driven or weight-driven.  If 
the relationship between the hull structure and the components placed within are such 
that the interior volume is used up prior to the overall design reaching its submergence 
weight, the design is said to be “arrangement-driven.”  Additional weight, usually in the 
form of lead ballast, must be added to an arrangement-driven design in order to 
submerge.  Arrangement-driven designs may be synonymously referred to as volume- or 
space-driven.  Alternatively, if the relationship between the hull structure and the 
components placed within are such that submergence weight is achieved prior to using up 
the available space, the design is said to be “weight-driven.”  Lead ballast or weight in 
some other form must be removed in order to add additional items to a weight-driven 
design.  Figures 1 and 2 provide a visual illustration of the difference between 


















Figure 2.   Weight-driven Design 
 
There is a general sense that a design is in harmony when the hull weight and 
associated diving depth have been adjusted to the point at which the useable internal 
volume is just sufficient to accommodate the space required by the installed systems and 
equipment (Burcher & Rydill, 1994). Designing for a deeper diving depth would require 
designers to adopt a thicker/heavier hull to counter the proportional increase in 
hydrostatic forces experienced at deeper depths.  This would necessitate a larger internal 
volume to restore the proper space/weight relationship to make neutral buoyancy 
Additional items cannot be added to a 
volume/arrangement/space-driven design 
 
The available volume has been filled prior to 
achieving submergence weight. 
 
Lead ballast is added in order to submerge. 
Additional items cannot be added to a weight-driven 
design. 
 
The submergence weight has been achieved prior to 
filling the available space. 
 
Lead is removed in order to add more items. 
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possible.  If the space requirements for the installed systems and equipment remained 
unchanged, the volume required would be less than the volume made available by the 
heavier/larger/deeper diving hull.  The weight needed to achieve neutral buoyancy would 
be achieved with space to spare, and the resulting design would be limited by weight.  It 
is likely the customer would consider this an inefficient use of space, and an analysis of 
tradeoffs would drive the design back toward an arrangement-driven scenario. It is for 
this reason that for the majority of submarine designs, decisions regarding diving depth, 
hull material, margin ballast and overall size are made such that the resulting initial 
design will be arrangement-driven (Burcher & Rydill, 1994). 
According to Burcher and Rydill (1994), one good strategy to create harmony 
between the submarine hull and its contents is to begin by treating the design as 
arrangement-driven (Burcher & Rydill, 1994).  Once the space requirements for the 
installed systems and equipment are determined, the hull is designed to accommodate 
them.  Trade-offs between the resultant diving depth, top-end speed, required hull 
material, etc., would be performed on a cost-benefit basis. The resulting design should 
possess performance parameters within customer expectations, while avoiding large 
amounts of unusable space caused by a premature achievement of submergence weight.  
Once fixed, the hull size and internal volume can no longer be used to achieve the proper 
space/weight balance.   
During the design effort, a space and/or weight margin policy is employed—
whereby allowances for growth in size and/or weight requirements will not cause the 
design to become either arrangement- or weight-driven prematurely.  According to 
Burcher and Rydill:  
If, when a new submarine design was complete and the first-of-class boat 
built, the weight margin had not been entirely consumed, the amount of 
solid ballast to be stowed on board would be larger than required.  Since 
the design would generally have been space [or arrangement] driven the 
submarine would not be larger than it need have been, just more stable.  If, 
exceptionally, the design was weight driven the submarine would, in the 
circumstances being discussed of an incompletely consumed weight 
margin, be larger than it need have been.  Either way, the outcome would 
be a small penalty to pay for the insurance afforded by weight margin 
policy against the more serious hazards of undercalling on weight. 
(Burcher & Rydill, 1994, p. 66)  
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The danger of becoming weight-limited prematurely in the submarine design 
process highlights the importance of reasonably conservative weight estimates and 
weight margins at the design onset.   If a design must incorporate greater flexibility—
having the capacity to incorporate future technologies—then the need to ensure the 
availability of weight and space margins extends past the end of the design effort and 
well into the service life of the submarine.  Indeed, if space and weight margins are 
entirely consumed during the design effort, the resultant submarine design may be 
capable of accomplishing the tasks for which it was designed, but wholly incapable of 
incorporating new technologies in the future.   An argument is made in Chapter II that 
suggests current rates of technological and tactical change imply that sustained suitability 
is only possible if sufficient space and weight margins survive the initial design process 
to allow for configuration changes throughout the design life of the hull.  This should be 
considered prior to employing strategies of submarine design (such as those by Burcher 
and Rydill) that were developed in an era when the need for current capability 
overshadowed any perceived need for future design flexibility.  
2. Weight Management 
Careful and meticulous weight management and accounting is critical to any 
successful submarine design effort.  Not only must the design achieve a specific weight 
target for the chosen volume, the weight must be distributed such that the centers of 
gravity and buoyancy are in proper absolute and relative positions for hydrostatic stability 
reasons.   
If a surface ship design exceeds its target weight, the resultant deeper draft and 
performance penalty will likely be tolerable. However, if a submarine design exceeds its 
weight target as dictated by the chosen volume, the consequences can be ruinous.  If all 
margins have been exhausted, there is no reserve buoyancy from which to borrow—as is 
the case with surface ships.  Permanent ballast must be removed, causing potentially 
unacceptable compromises in hydrostatic stability.  The only way to fix such a condition 




when such issues are uncovered is to lengthen the submarine hull.  Thus, the impact of 
the changes required to recover from a design that is overweight for its associated hull 
volume can be far-reaching and costly.   
Given the penalty for allocating insufficient weight margin, designers should 
carefully determine the right weight margin quantity. Unfortunately, according to Peter 
Canning, Manager of Naval Architecture at GD/EB, selecting the proper quantity of 
margin lead defies statistical analysis.  According to Canning, it is more a function of 
“How much money do you have in your pocket?” (Canning, 2008, March 25).  Burcher 
and Rydill also admit that the amount of margin lead for which to budget is a policy 
decision (Burcher & Rydill, 1994).   
There are several reasons to minimize the amount of weight margin allocated to a 
design.  First, each pound of margin lead represents an opportunity cost of one pound of 
current capability. Additionally, it is difficult to predict where the margin lead will 
ultimately be needed, and misplaced margin lead could be considered wasteful and 
inefficient.  Finally, the lead used is not necessarily cheap.     
Conversely, the tendency to undercall eventual weight requirements is more 
likely. Also, increased design innovation leads to further increases in weight-estimate 
uncertainty.  Finally, weight increases while in service are real and can be significant.   
The following comments were made by Admiral Hyman Rickover as part of his 
testimony before Congress, published in AEC Authorizing Legislation: Hearings before 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (1970).  
An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following 
basic characteristics: (1) is simple, (2) is small, (3) is cheap, (4) is light, 
(5) can be built very quickly, (6) is very flexible in purpose, (7) very little 
development will be required (it will use commercial off-the-shelf 
components), and (8) the reactor is in the study phase; it is not being built 
now.  
On the other hand, a practical reactor can be distinguished by the 
following characteristics: (1) is being built now, (2) is behind schedule, (3) 
requires an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items, 
(4) is very expensive, (5) takes a long time to build because of its 
engineering development problems, (6) is large, (7) is heavy, and (8) is 
complicated. (p. 1702) 
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Therefore, given the tendency to undercall the weight required, the increased uncertainty 
of innovation, the reserve capacity required to incorporate changes while in service and in 
spite of the difficulty to do so; decision makers must condone sufficiently conservative 
weight margin policies as to avoid the disproportionate increases in cost, schedule and 
performance risk that result when weight margins prematurely expire.  
3. Space Management 
In submarine design, space can refer to volume, deck surface area or stack-up 
length—depending on the type of space that tends to be limiting the options of the 
designer.  Like weight estimates, the identification of the true space required for various 
systems early in the design process is difficult and inherently inaccurate.  Additionally, 
late-term design changes or middle-of-life upgrades require weight and space margin, 
sufficient in both quantity and location, to be executable.  This would tend to advocate 
the use of a formal space-margin policy.   
While Burcher and Rydill acknowledge a natural tendency toward and a 
theoretical logic intrinsic in the idea of a space-margin policy, they warn of practical 
difficulties in its implementation. Many small space allocations could be quickly 
garnished by local relaxations while several larger spaces may not provide the space 
where it is needed (Burcher & Rydill, 1994).  As evidence, they cite the almost 
inescapable force of Parkinson’s Law, which states that the space required for a design 
will always expand to fill the space available (Burcher & Rydill, 1994). Yet, regardless of 
the relative difficulty, and perhaps because of it, designers of any successful submarine 
design effort must manage the space occupied by items and take measures to ensure 
space is available when the needs of the design so dictate.  Consequently, any constraint 
that would unnecessarily inhibit the realization of the optimal amount of space as dictated 
by the construction methods and the combined space requirements of the installed 
systems should be avoided.  
4. Summary 
Burcher and Rydill’s commentary on the employment of weight and space 
margins in submarine design strives to create a framework in which a capable and 
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efficient submarine may be designed and built by mitigating the risks associated with the 
initial undercalling of size or weight.  If plans are to employ a submarine design in its 
initial configuration throughout its design life, a first-of-class design with residual weight 
or space margins would be preferable, however, either of these would be considered 
wasteful nonetheless.   On the other hand, if rates of technological change or volatility in 
the threat matrix dictate that a submarine design be capable of incorporating future 
technology or reacting to an emerging threat, weight and space margins that survive the 
initial design process may be the only means by which a submarine design may have the 
flexibility to adapt.  Therefore, a submarine designed for flexibility and promising the 
lowest possible life cycle costs requires space and weight margin policies capable of 
producing a first-of-class submarine that is essentially neither space nor weight limited. 
B. WEIGHT AS A COST DRIVER  
1. Advantages 
Weight-based, parametric cost-estimating relationships (CERs) have gained 
widespread use among reputable Congressional, independent and Department of 
Defense-affiliated agencies. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has used weight-
based CERs to justify their recommendations to Congress on matters relating to reducing 
the cost of ship and submarine designs.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has 
used them to explain current cost overruns.  RAND Corporation has used weight as a 
proxy for design complexity in its analysis of ship and submarine cost escalation.  Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Cost Estimators use weight data routinely when 
costing large weapon systems.  One reason for the widespread use of weight as a cost 
driver is that weight data tend to be readily available and highly accurate. But perhaps the 
most compelling reason has been the apparently consistent relationship between cost and 
weight over time.   
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a. For Congress 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report entitled Navy Ship 
Acquisition:  Options for Lower-Cost Ship Designs—Issues for Congress dated June 23, 
2005, provides the following consolidated list of options for lower-cost attack submarine, 
aircraft carrier, and surface combatant ship designs:  
 reduce ship size 
 shift from nuclear to conventional propulsion 
 shift from a hull built to military survivability standards to a hull built to 
commercial-ship survivability standards 
 use a common hull design for multiple classes of ships  (O’Rourke, 2005, p. 3) 
According to the CRS report, the first option—reduce ship size—relies on an observation 
that, “for a given type of ship, procurement cost tends to be broadly proportional to ship 
size” (O’Rourke, 2005, p. 3).  In essence, the CRS is treating cost per unit weight as 
fixed, and is equating weight with size.  Given the cited link between weight and cost, 
their conclusion suggests that more size (or weight) will lead to higher costs.  Thus, one 
way to lower costs is to reduce size.  In a telephone interview with the researcher, Ronald 
O’Rourke (author of the above-mentioned CRS report) explained the CRS uses weight as 
a parametric cost estimator because weight data is what it has access to, and that weight 
has been shown to correlate well with cost in the past.  More recently, Eric Labs of the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)—in a testimony to Congress on March 14, 2008—
used weight-based parametric cost estimates to take issue with a number of Navy 
estimates on various ship programs (Labs, 2008). In essence, Labs and O’Rourke have 
reduced their procedure for predicting future ship costs and explaining present cost 
overruns to the results of a regression of cost and weight.  
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b. Among Independent Agencies 
RAND Corporation published a report exploring cost escalation in U.S. 
Navy ships and submarines (Arena, Blickstein, Younossi, & Grammich, 2006).  In it, 
they identified the following five drivers of ship and submarine cost divided into two 
broad classes: 
 Economy-driven Factors 
− Labor 
− Material and Equipment 
 Customer-driven Factors 
− Characteristic Complexity 
− Other Ship Features 
− Procurement Practices 
Of the five identified cost drivers, characteristic complexity is the one that refers to how 
changes to basic ship features (e.g., displacement, crew size, number of systems) make 
them more difficult to construct.  Light ship weight (LSW) was used along with power 
density as its proxy in multivariate regressions.  LSW, or light displacement, is the 
weight of the ship (in tons) including all permanent items.  It does not include variable 
loads such as crew, stores, and fuel.  Power density is the power generation capacity of a 
ship divided by LSW.  The reason cited as to why LSW and power density were used was 
their observed correlation with end-unit costs (Arena et al., 2006).  
c. Within the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Within the Department of Defense (DoD), weight-based cost estimation 
finds wide use as well.  For example, according to the NAVSEA 2005 Cost Estimating 
Handbook (CEH), “Weight is the most consistent physical property that the designer is 
able to provide to the ship cost estimator. Therefore, the most common parametric form 
employed in ship cost estimating uses weight as the technical parameter” (NAVSEA 
05U, 2005, p. 4-12).  In fact, “the three-digit weight breakdown is at the core of the 
NAVSEA ship cost estimating process and is mandatory for a Class C budget-quality 
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estimate” (NAVSEA 05U, 2005, p. 6F-9).  Additionally, “the basic construction category 
line of an end-cost estimate developed within the guidelines of the Ship Estimate 
Classification System always has a weight breakdown to support the estimate” 
(NAVSEA 05U, 2005, p. 6F-9). 
d. Summary 
Arguments for the treatment of weight as a cost driver and its advantages 
have been made; they are well known and are well understood by those who use them 
and receive their results.  However, the nuances and the limitations associated with 
weight-based cost estimation are less often made; they are not as well known nor as well 
understood by those who use them, and especially by those who receive and often act on 
their results.  These nuances and limitations are discussed in the following section. They 
serve to reveal the growing inadequacy of weight alone as a cost driver in submarine 
design and procurement.  They also serve to highlight the dangers of managing weight as 
an indirect means of managing cost.  Upon this foundation, a theoretical basis is formed 
for the incorporation of density as a means to better predict the effect various design 
decisions will ultimately have on submarine costs.   
2. Disadvantages 
Each of the organizations that use or advocate the use of weight-based cost 
estimates caution their audiences on the limitations and potential inaccuracy of such an 
approach. For example: 
a. Within the Department of Defense (DoD)   
The NAVSEA Cost Estimating Handbook states that, “While weight is the 
most commonly used technical parameter and has been shown in practice to provide good 
estimates, the cost estimator is encouraged to explore other available parameters to be 
used with or in lieu of weight” (NAVSEA 05U, 2005, p. 4-14).  Additionally, “In those 
increasing number of cases in which weight may not be the best cost-estimating 
parameter; e.g., state-of-the-art lightweight materials or combat systems for which 
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suitable CERs have not been developed, the resourceful estimator is encouraged to seek 
out other parameters to enhance the cost estimate” (NAVSEA 05U, 2005, p. 6F-9).  In 
fact, in the area of submarine design, the NAVSEA Cost Estimating Handbook reveals 
that a majority of the CERs used in developing submarine estimates are not weight-based.   
b. Among Independent Agencies 
RAND Corporation qualified its use of light ship weight (LSW) as a cost 
driver in ship and submarine procurement by noting that, “these relationships are 
associative and not necessarily causal.  In other words, going to a smaller ship will not 
always result in a lower-cost vessel” (Arena, Blickstein, Younossi & Grammich, 2006, p. 
xv).  Another RAND report cautions, “Some risk arises from the inherent uncertainty in 
making any kind of cost or schedule estimate for an action that has no real analogue” 
(Birkler, Schank, Smith, Timson, Chiesa., Goldberg, Mattock & MacKinnon, 1994, p. 
xxiii-xxiv). 
c. For Congress   
Although, Labs of the CBO frequently employed weight-based cost 
estimates in his previously mentioned congressional testimony, he gave just as many 
examples of instances in which special circumstances led to the breakdown of the 
relationship between weight and cost.  For example, the following is a quote from his 
testimony: “Reflecting its more complex combat systems, the cost per thousand tons of 
the lead Ticonderoga was more than 60% higher than the cost of the lead Spruance, 
notwithstanding their many common hull and mechanical systems” (Labs, 2008, p. 19). 
Finally, O’Rourke with the CRS admits regarding his previously mentioned options for 
Congress that, “Lower-cost ship designs using these approaches will in most cases be 
individually less capable than the currently planned ship designs from which they are 
derived” (O’Rourke, 2005, p. 3). 
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d. Epiphany at Electric Boat 
“Weight is great for [steel] plate,” but not for much else, according to 
Dave Bergheimer, a GD/EB Cost Engineer (2008, March 25).  During an interview with 
the researcher, he discussed an epiphany of sorts that occurred in the late 1960s as 
Electric Boat transitioned from building Sturgeon Class submarines to designing and 
procuring the Los Angeles Class.  Cost estimates were off—in part because the weight of 
electronics from Sturgeon to Los Angeles went down, but electronics costs rose 
significantly.  This triggered a revolution in how Electric Boat performed its internal cost 
estimates.  In essence, it discovered that cost per unit weight was becoming increasingly 
variable and heavily influenced by technology, acquisition environment, industrial base 
and other factors.  Such factors had, to date, lacked the volatility required to disrupt the 
theoretical basis for the broad-based application of weight-based cost estimates.  In the 
time since, the situations where weight-based cost estimates remained the preferred 
costing method steadily declined to the point where today, GD/EB uses weight based 
CERs for little other than steel plate costing.  The cost engineers and naval architects at 
Electric Boat expressed a concern that alternatives to weight-based cost estimates have 
not been fully embraced elsewhere. 
e. Premature Obsolescence 
According to the previously mentioned CBO testimony (Labs, 2008, 
March 14), 14 of 18 recent ship classes have been decommissioned, on average, due to 
obsolescence prior to reaching their design end of life.  This trend reveals a need to 
design for increased flexibility—which often means incorporating weight and space 
margins so that a hull designed to last 30-50 years can remain relevant.  For example, 
over a 20-year period, the Los Angeles Class gained 60 pounds per day (on average) due 
to upgrades and configuration changes.  These additions had to be offset by the removal 
of margin lead such that the overall weight and centers of buoyancy and gravity could 
remain within the constraints necessary for a hydrostatically stable design.  Based on the 
locations where additional systems and equipment would likely be installed (above the 
centers of gravity and buoyancy) and the location of lead capable of providing an offset 
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(below the centers of gravity and buoyancy), the Los Angeles Class has essentially 
transitioned from arrangement-limited to weight-limited, preventing the economical 
addition of additional capability.  If future submarine designs are made smaller and 
lighter, sufficient weight and space margins may not exist—leading to a premature 
transition to a weight-limited design and ultimately causing the submarine hull to outlive 
its tactical usefulness. 
f. Moore’s Law 
Moore’s Law—first postulated by Gordon E. Moore in April 1965 in an 
article in the Electronics Journal entitled, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated 
Circuits”—is based on an assertion that the number of transistors that can be 
economically placed on an integrated circuit will approximately double every two years.  
The theory behind Moore’s Law represents a powerful analog to the potential interaction 
effects between a submarine hull and its contents.    
According to Moore: 
For simple circuits, the cost per component is nearly inversely 
proportional to the number of components, the result of the equivalent 
piece of semiconductor in the equivalent package containing more 
components. But as components are added, decreased yields more than 
compensate for the increased complexity, tending to raise the cost per 
component. Thus there is a minimum cost at any given time in the 
evolution of the technology. (1965, p. 2)   




Figure 3.   Range of Manufacturing Costs per Component versus the Number of 
Components per Integrated Circuit (From: Moore, 1965) 
 
The number of components per integrated circuit is analogous to density 
as it is defined for this research.  The relative Manufacturing Cost per Component is 
analogous to the cost per capability delivered—a metric difficult to quantify, but can be 
qualitatively inferred.   If the analogy holds, as the quantity of systems and equipment 
installed within a submarine hull increase, the cost per capability provided will decrease 
due to the fact that the hull costs are spread over more capability.  However, eventually 
the cost incurred by exploring creative ways to further increase the quantity of installed 
capability will grow at a rate greater than the rate of capability increase, and the cost per 
installed capability will rise.  Therefore, for a submarine design, there exists some 
quantity of installed systems and equipment that minimizes the cost per delivered 
capability.  Further, this cost-optimized point does not correspond to the maximum that 
current technology is capable of achieving. 
Beyond the analogy between Moore’s Law and density as a cost driver, 
what Moore’s Law has meant for ships and submarines—such as the Arleigh Burke Class 
destroyer and the Los Angeles Class fast-attack submarine—is that the large and heavy 
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electronics installed in the 1970s and 1980s have been replaced with today’s much 
smaller and lighter equipment.  Such advancements acted as space and weight margins 
for future modification and upgrades as new technology became available.   
Over the next 30 years, however, there are reasons Moore’s Law should 
not be relied upon to as a means to realize design flexibility.  For example, the thermal 
envelope and associated cooling requirements are becoming the limiting factors in adding 
technology to spaces provided by shrinking electronics. Additionally, standardized 
electronics spaces, such as the Structurally Integrated Enclosures (SIEs) in the Virginia 
Class, fix the volume within which electronic systems may be installed.  Given that 
weight and space margin policies have benefited from electronics shrinkage in a way that 
may not be sustained into the future, increasingly deliberate methods should be employed 
to preserve the capacity to incorporate emerging technology. 
g. Deck Surface Area 
The chart depicted in Figure 4 shows deck surface area per volume for 
various hull diameters.  According to Jeff Phfister at NGSB (2008, February 18), 
designing the interior spaces of a submarine is largely a two-dimensional problem, driven 
by the amount of deck surface area available.  Thus, submarine designers strive to 
maximize the amount of useable deck surface area per given volume.  In fact, 
maximizing deck surface area is a major determinant in the selection of a submarine hull 
diameter.  What is evident from Figure 4 is that for a given number of decks, the deck 
surface area is maximized on a per-volume basis at the minimum hull diameter.  The hull 




Figure 4.   Deck Surface Area per Pressure Hull Volume for Various Hull Diameters 
(After: Joubert, 2006) 
 
What is not immediately evident on the above chart is that the locations of 
the local maxima are not fixed, but rather are dependent on the construction method.  
Modularity demands an increased hull diameter to accommodate the added space that 
modular systems and construction methods require.  Submarine designs have tended 
toward more modular designs, as have hull diameters—but this is not to say that they 
haven’t done so under constant opposition from proponents of the notion that the smallest 
diameter yields the highest deck surface area per volume.  When submitting its diameter 
recommendation for the Virginia Class submarine, of 33, 34 or 35 feet, GD/EB 
recommended 34 feet.  Knowing what its designers know now and given the opportunity, 
GD/EB designers conceded 35 feet may have been preferable from a producibility, 
habitability and ultimately a life cycle cost perspective (Canning, 2008, March 25). 
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h. Hydrodynamic Drag 
Hydrodynamic drag is the force a submarine must overcome to propel 
itself through the water.  It is made up of pressure drag and skin friction.  The total 
hydrodynamic drag for a given submarine volume varies with the ratio of length and 
diameter (L/D), as shown in Figure 5.  Tear drop- or Albacore-shaped hulls experience 
minimum drag at an L/D between 6 and 7 (8 with appendages) (Joubert, 2006).   
Design decisions regarding submarine length are almost entirely driven by 
the minimum stack-up length of components that must be placed low and along the 
longitudinal centerline of the hull.  Submarine diameters are typically minimized as to 
achieve the maximum deck surface area per volume (per Figure 4) or based on some 
other limiting component.  When the minimized length is combined with the minimized 
hull diameter, a suboptimal L/D results.   
The L/D is driven further from the optimum when designers undercall 
ultimate weight of the installed systems and equipment and then design requires more 
interior volume to compensate.  Often the only way to deliver the additional volume is to 
lengthen the submarine.  This then drives the L/D further away from the optimum.  The 
combined effect of diameter and length minimization as a means to obtain the least 
possible cost position has resulted in submarine designs with suboptimal hydrodynamic 
characteristics.  






Figure 5.   Total Hydrodynamic Drag versus the Ratio of Submarine Length and 
Diameter (After: Joubert, 2006) 
 
i. Mass Dispersion 
The previous examples reveal that weight-optimized designs do not 
necessarily minimize costs.  To illustrate this point further, consider the analysis 
conducted at Quonset Point Shipyard circa 1987 when the shipyard was involved in the 
production of both the Los Angeles Class and Ohio Class submarines simultaneously. 
Todd Sedler (2007, November 8), an Engineer for NGSB, was asked to 
investigate why NGSB’s labor estimations tracked so poorly as part of the Los Angeles 
Class  modular construction program and to recommend a solution.  He was also asked to 
determine which deck design methodology was more cost effective to build.  NGSB 
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traditionally designed its decks as a T-on-plate, while GD/EB traditionally designed its 
decks as a plate-on-I-beam.  The load-bearing capacity and shock requirements were 
identical for both designs.  The T-on-plate was used for the Los Angeles Class, and the 
plate-on-I-beam was for the Ohio Class, both of which were under construction at 
Quonset Point at the time. 
To investigate, Sedler observed the workers as they built various Ohio and 
Los Angeles decks around the facility.  It was quickly apparent that labor was being 
driven in large part by the ease of accessibility for welding.  This observation also held 
for tanks and bulkheads. Accessibility was a missing component in the company’s labor-
estimation procedure.  The question became how important was accessibility, and how 
could it be quantified.  He came up with what he called the mass dispersion factor.  This 
simple parameter is closely related to the physical parameter of density.  The mass 
dispersion factor is calculated by dividing the gross volume (cubic feet) occupied by the 
deck into the total weight (pounds) of the deck; this yields a pound per cubic foot (lb/ft3) 
parameter that reflects how tightly packed or dispersed the mass in the deck is.  Figure 6 





















Figure 6.   Mass Dispersion Example Calculation and Results (After: Sedler, 2007, 
November 8) 
 
Sedler calculated a mass dispersion factor for every forward-end and 
machinery compartment deck being built for the Ohio and Los Angles Classes.  He then 
used the actual labor recorded for each deck and divided the labor by the weight of the 
deck to obtain a man-hour per pound of deck weight value.  He could now plot the mass 
dispersion factor against the man-hours per pound. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that weight-optimized structures are very 
labor intensive. There are explanations for this.  First, welding access is poor because 
weight-optimized designs typically consist of a lot of small, closely fit pieces.  Second, 
weight-optimized structures tend to use thinner material—which distorts more easily 
during the welding process and, thus, requires more re-work, such as flame straightening. 
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The resulting curve shows that machinery decks that tend to use large, 
deep and widely separated frames result in a low mass dispersion factor (large volume for 
given weight).  On the other hand, forward-end decks—which are relatively small, 
closely packed frames—result in a high mass dispersion factor (small volume for a given 
weight).  Ultimately, what becomes apparent is a range of mass dispersion that minimizes 
cost, which does not correspond to the mass dispersion of weight-optimized designs.  It is 
a primary objective of this research to determine if such a phenomenon can be 
demonstrated for submarine designs as a whole. 
j. Summary 
The primary difficulty with arguing that size or weight, whether increased 
or decreased, will result in predictable cost behavior is that size and weight alone do not 
capture the interaction between a vessel’s structure and its installed systems and 
equipment. Unanticipated consequences may result if a decision is made to unilaterally 
reduce the size of a ship or submarine design without adjusting the quantity of internal 
systems and installed equipment.  Designing these systems to perform similarly in the 
smaller space may lead to increases in complexity and the need for specialized parts, 
materials and construction methods; this, in turn, could drive up design hours, production 
hours and material costs.  Design changes, maintenance and repairs may become more 
difficult and costly due to increased interference issues and reduced accessibility.  Before 
long, the cost savings sought by reducing structural weight of the vessel may be more 
than offset by cost increases elsewhere.  It seems density—a parameter that speaks to 
both the size of a vessel and the utilization of the internal spaces—may be a better 
predictor of design, procurement and even total life cycle costs. 
C. DENSITY AS A COST DRIVER 
The implications of breaking the long-standing tradition of treating weight as an 
independent variable and treating cost per unit weight as fixed or growing at a constant 
rate are potentially significant.   The following are potential benefits of incorporating 
density effects into future cost estimates and design decisions. 
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The incorporation of density effects could: 
1. Contribute to conversations about the correct mix of capability and flexibility 
in a design by allowing informed decisions regarding the space required and 
the cost to incorporate design flexibility, modularity, maintainability, 
reliability and life cycle cost-efficiency into future submarine designs. 
2. Highlight the importance of a deliberate and carefully guarded acquisition 
strategy, and provide a means to reconcile seemingly contradictory strategic 
design goals. 
3. Expose both the need and the means to compare naval ship and submarine 
designs of various types, sizes and levels of complexity. 
1. Capability vs. Flexibility 
An investment in design flexibility is warranted when the costs of change and 
uncertainty about the future are high. Figure 7 illustrates this relationship.  Unfortunately, 
increased flexibility often comes at the expense of current capability.  Figure 8 shows an 
efficient frontier of capability and flexibility.  According to the curve, a full investment in 
current capability implies that the resulting design would be wholly inflexible.  At the 
opposite extreme, a completely flexible vessel lacks any current capability.  The area 
bound by the curve represents the feasible region; the area under this region indicates the 
amount of resources available to invest.  A family of indifference curves exist with 
shapes governed by the environment in which the specific submarine design will operate. 
The right mix of capability and flexibility is found at the point where the marginal cost in 
foregone capability equals the marginal gain in flexibility.  This is indicated at the point 
where the indifference curve is tangent to the efficient frontier.  If technology is changing 
slowly, and if the tactical environment is relatively stable, capability should be favored 
over flexibility.  This is represented on the efficient frontier by a relatively flat 
indifference curve, tangent at point x in Figure 8. However, if technology is changing 
rapidly or if the tactical landscape is uncertain, the investment mix should shift toward 
flexibility and away from current capability.  The indifference curve rotates clockwise in 
response to this change in environment—causing a change in the proper mix of capability 





Figure 7.   When to Invest in Flexibility 
 
 
Figure 8.   Capability and Flexibility Efficient Frontier 
 
In a fiscally constrained environment, decision-makers have a tendency to 
become shortsighted when seeking cost efficiencies.  Design characteristics that 
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impact on costs to be incurred in later phases of the life cycle.  Current capability may be 
valued over future flexibility, and investment in the latter may be reduced.  This is 
indicated on Figure 8 as point y.  The danger in allowing such policies to go unchecked is 
that increased operating costs and prematurely irrelevant designs will constrain fiscal 
resources even further and will shorten the time between major design efforts.   
Flexible submarine designs are larger than designs optimized for current 
capability.  Increasing the size of a submarine design to incorporate flexibility may not be 
justifiable if the perceived cost is artificially inflated due to misconceptions about 
relationships between cost and weight.  However, investments in flexibility may become 
justifiable if cost-estimators can show that the costs incurred by designing and building a 
larger submarine are less than weight-based cost-estimating relationships would suggest.  
Density reduction would then become a low-hanging fruit capable of granting additional 
design flexibility with minimal reductions in current capability—all at a lower cost than 
current wisdom would suggest. 
2. Acquisition Strategy 
Michael Porter, a professor at the Harvard Business School and leading authority 
on competitive strategy, created a system of categorizing business strategies into three 
broad segments.  They are cost leadership, differentiation, and focus (also called market 
segmentation). Figure 9 shows the strategies mapped on a matrix of market scope and 
product type. A focus strategy is narrow in scope, while cost leadership and 
differentiation are relatively broad in market scope. The goal of a cost leadership strategy 
is to offer relatively standard products, but to produce them at such a low cost that the 
products can be offered at a price below that of the competition.  A differentiation 
strategy seeks to create a specialized product that is particularly valued by the 
customer—such that the associated cost structure can be higher, but the customer is 
willing to pay a premium for the differentiated product to more than compensate for the 
higher cost structure.  The focus strategy focuses on a narrow customer base and 
produces a customized product that meets the specific needs of the narrowly targeted 
customer (Porter, 1980). 
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Porter emphasizes that these strategies tend to be mutually exclusive; only one 
strategy can be successfully employed at a given time.  To adopt a strategy that is neither 
fully cost leadership nor fully differentiation would create a situation referred to as being 
“stuck in the middle.”  A symptom of this condition is an organization that has lost its 
focus such that a clear vision about where the organization is headed cannot be 
established.  This argument is based on the idea that a differentiation strategy requires a 
cost structure that is incompatible with the cost leadership strategy.  Similarly, the 
standard products of a cost leadership strategy contain no differentiation. Therefore, cost 
leadership and differentiation strategies are incompatible (Porter, 1980).  
Throughout the previous century, the Navy has adjusted its submarine acquisition 
strategy in response to advancements in technology and changes in the threat 
environment.  Figure 9 shows the Submarine Force’s strategic position over time.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Changing Strategic Position of the U.S. Submarine Force over Time 
 
The Submarine Force marketed early submarine designs using a focused cost 
leadership strategy.  Indeed, submarines were the low-cost solution for anti-merchant and 
anti-warship tactics during WWI and WWII.     
The advent of nuclear power redefined the realm of possibilities for submarines.  













advantages meant shifting its strategy from one of focused cost leadership to one of 
focused differentiation.  Indefinite patrol capability, no refueling, submerged transit and 
operations, and the safety features and quality control required to operate a nuclear 
reactor did not come cheap, but it was a service that the Navy sold successfully and a 
service that Congress was willing to pay for.  The submarines that entered the Cold War 
were much bigger, faster and more capable than the workhorses of previous conflicts, yet 
their mission still remained fairly one-dimensional.  Thus, the strategic position for the 
Submarine Force during the Cold War had shifted to one of focused differentiation. 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an interesting era for 
submarines.  Without a symmetric threat, the Navy was compelled to justify submarines’ 
continued relevance based on their potential versatility.  With a submarine fleet 
optimized for Cold War conflicts, the Navy began exploring the services submarines 
could provide in other arenas.  This pushed submarines from satisfying a focused mission 
to providing a broad range of services.  The resulting strategic position during the post 
Cold War era was one of broad differentiation. 
In the time since, the Navy has experienced growing pressure to trim costs 
wherever possible due to increased internal and external pressures on the defense budget.  
The Navy has responded by returning to the tenets of a cost leadership strategy in the 
area of ship, aircraft and submarine acquisition while continuing to serve the broad 
capability set expected by its customers.  This has pushed the Submarine Force toward a 
broad cost leadership strategic position.   
Unfortunately, the broad cost leadership strategic stance the Navy is seeking may 
be unattainable due to a continued desire for the differentiated capabilities current 
submarines provide.   Figure 9 shows that the Navy may find itself “stuck in the middle” 
seeking an unachievable goal if a deliberate stance is not taken one way or the other.   
This is based on the tendency for acquirers to exploit product and process improvements 
to increase capability and reduce cost simultaneously.  In fact, each product or process 




1. Increase the amount of capability in the same volume,  
2. Reduce the volume required to offer the same capability, or  
3. Provide same capability in the same volume at a lower cost. 
A strategic contradiction occurs when ship and submarine designs are built smaller 
as a means to lower costs, while installed capability is maximized for the same reason.  
The smaller space requires increased innovation to incorporate the same capabilities.  If 
increased capability per hull is desired, a larger—not smaller—design must be 
incorporated as to avoid the penalties associated with unnecessarily complex and 
congested designs. 
3. Compensated Gross Tonnage 
The practice of comparing commercial ships and commercial shipyards using 
weight measurements was standard practice in the commercial shipbuilding industry until 
the late 1960s.  As ship designs became more complex and as shipyards began to adopt 
more modern shipbuilding techniques, raw weight measurements became increasingly 
incapable of capturing the amount of shipyard workload required to complete tasks.  
Without a common measurement of shipyard activity, measurements of relative shipyard 
efficiency were not possible.  
In 1966 and 1967, the Community of European Shipyards Associations (CESA) 
and the Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan (SAJ) met to develop a better measure of 
shipyard activity (OECD, 2007).  They were motivated by a need to provide more 
accurate comparisons of the efficiency of shipyards producing ships of various types, 
sizes and levels of complexity.  The compensated gross ton (cgt) concept was developed 
and formally introduced in 1968. “The cgt-system is a statistical tool developed in order 
to enable a more accurate macro-economic evaluation of shipbuilding workload than is 
possible on a pure deadweight tons (dwt) or gross tons (gt) basis” (OECD, 2007, p. 4).   
In 1970, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
adopted and promulgated a joint system for calculating the compensated gross ton (cgt). 
The concept underwent a number of revisions, with significant updates introduced in 
1984, 1994 and most recently in 2007.  The current cgt system was jointly developed by 
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the CESA, the SAJ and the Korean Shipbuilders Association (KSA), who together 
represent approximately 75% of world shipbuilding output (OECD, 2007). 








The ship type factor, A, varies with ship complexity.  The ship size factor, B, is 
actually defined as B=b+1, where b represents the diminishing influence of ship size on 
the work input required to build a single gross ton (OECD, 2007). Therefore, the 
compensated gross tonnage of a ship is a function of the size, weight and complexity of 
the ship design.  The cost to build a ship depends on the contracted shipyard’s efficiency 
in producing compensated gross tons.  The A and B factors for various commercial ship 
types are shown in Table 1.  Compensated gross tonnage factors do not yet exist for non-





( )Bcgt A gt= ⋅
cgt compensated gross tonnage
A ship type factor
gt vessel gross tonnage


















A plot of oil tanker compensated gross tons versus gross tons is provided in 
Figure 10 for illustrative purposes.  Note that for oil tankers, gross tons and compensated 
gross tons are equal at 8,000 tons.  This value corresponds to the gross tonnage of a 
small, general purpose oil tanker and represents the baseline ship for comparison 
purposes.  Holding capability constant, compensated gross tonnage theory suggests oil 
tankers larger than the baseline should require less effort and should consistently cost less 
per gross ton to produce.  This is represented by a compensated gross tonnage that is less 
than the gross tonnage of the vessel.  Figure 10 shows that this is the case.  Similarly, oil 
tankers smaller than the baseline require more effort per gross ton to achieve the same 
capability in a smaller vessel.  This is represented by a compensated gross tonnage that is 
more than the gross tonnage of the vessel.   
Ship Type A B 
Car carriers 15 0.70 
Full container 19 0.68 
Ferries 20 0.71 
Fishing vessels 24 0.71 
General cargo ships 27 0.64 
Reefers 27 0.68 
Bulk carriers 29 0.61 
Ro Ro vessels 32 0.63 
LNG carriers 32 0.68 
Combined carriers 33 0.62 
NCCV 46 0.62 
Oil tankers (double hull) 48 0.57 
Passenger ships 49 0.67 
LPG carriers 62 0.57 
Chemical tankers 84 0.55 
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Figure 10.   Oil Tanker Compensated Gross Tonnage vs. Gross Tonnage 
 
In August 2005, First Marine International, Ltd., (FMI) reported the results of its 
Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study (GSIBBS) undertaken by the 
U.S. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) (ODUSD(IP)) 
in 2004/2005.  Compensated gross tonnage formed the basis for its shipyard productivity 
estimates (FMI, 2005).  The objectives of the study were to: 
 Compare the practices of U.S. and selected leading international commercial 
and naval/military shipbuilders in Europe and Asia. 
 Identify specific changes to U.S. shipbuilding industry processes and to U.S. 
naval design and acquisition practices that will improve the performance of 
the shipbuilding enterprise. (FMI, 2005, p. 1) 
Due to the nonexistence of cgt factors for military naval vessels and the 
shipyards’ inability to provide data for their calculation, FMI estimated cgt factors for 
these vessel types.  FMI used public-domain data and visual inspections of some of the 
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The overall performance of U.S. shipyards has been plotted in Figure 11 over the 
results of a 1992 study conducted by KPMG (UK) and FMI on the competitiveness of 
European Shipyards, together with results from subsequent studies.  The range of 
possible values for U.S. shipyards reflects the uncertainty in the cgt calculations by FMI.  
The study found a correlation between shipyard performance (measured in man-hours per 
cgt) and the shipyards’ adherence to a list of best practices (measured in overall best-
practice rating).   
 
Figure 11.   Man-hours per CGT versus FMI Rating (From: FMI, 2005) 
 
The FMI analysis suggests that U.S. surface combatants have more work content 
per gross ton than the equivalent international vessel—leading to high cgt values.  FMI 
observed that one major contributor to the high work content of U.S. naval vessels is the 
increased levels of management, technical and administrative resources required to 
execute the design and procurement effort.  Other sources of increased work content arise 
due to advances in technology, the addition of more capability to fewer vessels and 
compromises between the Navy and Congress.  All these combine to contribute to trends  
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of increasing complexity.  Increased complexity reduces shipyard productivity in the 
form of a first-of-class performance drop-off phenomenon and sustained lower 
performance.   
The principle driver of complexity and, hence, work content identified by FMI, is 
design specification.  FMI estimates that a U.S. destroyer (DDG) contains 50% more 
work content than a comparable modern international destroyer.  FMI also contends that 
part of the difference is capability related, but a significant portion is due to the density 
and general complexity of the vessel (FMI, 2005).  The study stresses that an incremental 
increase in the complexity of an already complex vessel results in a disproportionate 
increase in work content.  Said another way, increasing the quantity of installed systems 
or equipment in a vessel without adjusting the size of the vessel—or making a vessel 
smaller without adjusting the quantity of installed systems and equipment—will lead to 
cost increases greater than can likely be justified by the associated marginal increase in 
capability or performance. 
In short, FMI warns that:  
Cost, risk, first-of-class performance drop-off and the probability of cost 
and schedule overrun, all increase with vessel complexity.  Therefore, if 
exposure to all of the above is to be minimized, overly complex vessels 
should be avoided.  The current trend for complex vessels may not be 
giving the best balance between capability and value for the money. (FMI, 




A. GENERAL APPROACH 
The following procedure was developed and executed in order to derive and test 
alternative measures of complexity for several submarine classes and to investigate their 
relationship to cost: 
 
1. Develop a theoretical basis for density as a cost-driver 
a. Interviews with Engineers, Naval Architects, Cost Estimators, Acquisition 
Professionals, Program Managers  
b. Literature review 
2. Select submarines for analysis 
3. Collect data 
a. Gather cost data 
i. Normalize cost data 
ii. Create relevant cost segments 
b. Gather hours data 
i. Design hours 
ii. Production hours 
c. Gather design data 
i. Weights 
ii. Volumes 
iii. Permeability values 
4. Calculate measures of density 
5. Regress cost/hours vs. measures of density 
6. Identify trends 
7. Provide observations and recommendations for future analysis 
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B. SUBMARINES SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS 
Each submarine design contains a mix of incremental and revolutionary design 
changes relative to its predecessor.  In fact, the decision to procure a new class of 
submarines is only justifiable to the extent it is seen as the best means to exploit new 
technologies and/or confront emerging threats in a way that the current submarine classes 
or some non-material alternative are unable.  In selecting the submarines to be used for 
analysis, a careful balance between maximizing the number of submarine classes 
considered and excluding non-analogous submarine designs from the data set was the 
primary objective.  Data maximization is crucial, since for each of the regressions 
performed, a particular submarine class would provide but one datum point.  The 
exclusion of non-analogous submarine designs is needed to minimize opportunities to 
draw conclusions from observed trends that may lack a sound theoretical basis for 
comparison.  This reality is a significant contributing factor to the difficulty in identifying 
modern submarine cost-drivers.   
The submarines selected for this study consist of the six most recent nuclear 
submarine classes acquired by the U.S. Navy.  This group includes two ballistic missile 
submarine classes and four fast-attack submarine classes.  The ballistic missile 
submarines are of the USS George Washington (SSBN 598) and the USS Ohio (SSBN 
726) Classes.  The fast-attack submarines are of the USS Sturgeon (SSN 637), USS Los 
Angeles (SSN 688), USS Seawolf (SSN 21) and USS Virginia (SSN 774) Classes.  
Where deemed relevant, the USS Los Angeles (SSN 688) Class was subdivided into two 
of its major design evolutions: the “Classic” Los Angeles Class, starting with SSN-688, 









Below are the characteristics of the submarine classes selected for analysis: 
 
USS George Washington (SSBN 598) Class 
 Surface Displacement: 7331 Long Tons (LT) 
 Submerged Displacement: 8248 LT 
 Length:   425 ft 
 Diameter:   33 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  1959-1961 
 
USS Sturgeon (SSN 637) Class 
 Surface Displacement: 4256 LT 
 Submerged Displacement: 4779 LT 
 Length:   292 ft 
 Diameter:   32 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  1967-1975 
 
USS Ohio (SSBN 726) Class 
Surface Displacement: 16730 LT 
 Submerged Displacement: 18748 LT 
 Length:   560 ft 
 Diameter:   42 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  1981-1997 
 
USS Los Angeles (SSN 688) Class 
 Surface Displacement: 6086 LT 
 Submerged Displacement: 6929 LT 
 Length:   360 ft 
 Diameter:   33 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  1976-1985 
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USS Los Angeles (SSN 688) “Improved” Class  
 Surface Displacement: 6127 LT 
 Submerged Displacement: 6859 LT 
 Length:   360 ft 
 Diameter:   33 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  1988-1997 
 
USS Seawolf (SSN 21) Class  
 Surface Displacement: 8097 LT 
 Submerged Displacement: 9137 LT 
 Length:   353 ft 
 Diameter:   40 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  1997-2005 
 
USS Virginia (SSN 774) Class  
 Surface Displacement: 6980 LT 
 Submerged Displacement: 7841 LT 
 Length:   377 ft 
 Diameter:   34 ft 
 Years Commissioned:  2004-present 
 
C. DATA  
1. Cost Data 
Cost data used for analysis were retrieved from the "Historical Cost of Ships" 
database program maintained by NAVSEA 05U.  According to the 2005 NAVSEA Cost 
Estimating Handbook, the “Historical Cost of Ships” database contains initial 
acquisition/major conversion costs and technical data for Navy ships and craft from 1900 
to the present.  For ships built after 1952, it also contains SCN end-cost data broken-out 
by P-5 budget category. An example of a P-5 budget report is provided in Appendix B.  
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The database provides a central data source containing budget and actual cost data on 
delivered ships and craft and is used to respond to questions from higher echelon 
Navy/DoD on cost of historical ships (Deegan, 2005).  
NAVSEA 05U provided SCN end-cost data broken-out by P-5 budget category, 
organized according to class and hull number for the lead and follow-on submarines in 
each submarine class selected for analysis.  The major categories of the P-5 Exhibit 
applicable to submarines are: 
 Basic Construction—includes all allowable shipbuilder direct labor, indirect 
labor (overhead), and material costs required to construct the ship, plus an amount 
for shipbuilder cost of money and profit. 
 Construction Plans—includes the nonrecurring costs related to detailed 
construction plans and other associated engineering tasks for lead ships. Planning 
yard, lead yard, and follow yard costs for ship classes may also be accounted for 
in this category or in the Basic Construction category. 
 Change Orders—consists of dollars required to fund necessary changes after the 
shipbuilding contract is awarded. 
 Electronics—includes production components, training support equipment, 
sonars, towed arrays, combat systems, external communications, satellite 
navigation and communication equipment, integrated command and control (C2) 
communication equipment, integrated C2 systems, computers and displays, test 
and engineering services, and repair parts associated with installation. 
 HM&E (Hull, Mechanical & Electrical)—includes items such as interior 
communications, inertial navigation systems, deep submergence systems, 
periscopes, small boats, inflatable life boats, special vehicles, environmental 
protection equipment, training support equipment, repair parts associated with 
installation of HM&E equipment, propulsion equipment (non-nuclear), electric 
generator and motor equipment, and all medical equipment provided by the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED). 
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 Propulsion—includes turbines, gears, and nuclear propulsion reactors and 
associated equipment. 
 Other Cost—provides a convenient catch-all of miscellaneous but important 
categories of an end-cost estimate, including Test and Instrumentation (T&I), Stock 
Shore-based Spares and Other Support. 
 Ordnance—includes fire and missile control systems, search radars, missile 
launching systems, gun systems, training support equipment, test and integration 
services and other ordnance equipment.  
 Escalation—the cost to be paid to the shipbuilder for the effects of inflation over 
the long ship construction period. 
The summation of these categories is referred to as the ship End-cost and represents the 
total cost of constructing and integrating the ship and shipboard components (NAVSEA 
05U, 2005). 
a. Cost Data Normalization 
The SCN End-cost data broken-out by P-5 budget category contained 
within the the "Historical Cost of Ships" database program are recorded in Then-year 
(TY) dollars according to either the Labor Midpoint (LM) or the Material Midpoint 
(MM), which are unique for each submarine hull (NAVSEA 05U, 2005). According to 
the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), TY dollars are synonymous with Budget 
(BY) dollars, which are funds inflated for budgeting purposes that include inflation for 
the years of expenditure, calculated using the outlay profile of the relevant acquisition 















To enable meaningful cost comparisons among submarines and submarine 
classes, the cost data were normalized to a common Constant Year (CY), where CY 
refers to a categorization of funds from which the effects of inflation have been removed.  
Therefore it is possible to compare purchasing power or funding between years 
(NAVSEA 05U, 2005).  All cost data used for this research, unless otherwise noted, have 
been normalized to CY 2007 dollars using SCN-specific inflation indices provided by the 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA).  
b. Relevant Cost Categories 
The various submarine density approximations developed for this study 
were regressed against submarine end-cost values and meaningful segments of submarine 
end-cost. The various P-5 budget category elements that make up an end-cost estimate 
can be grouped into three cost segments useful for trend analysis.  The three cost 
segments, per CEH, are: 
 Shipbuilder Costs,  
 Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) and  
 Other. (NAVSEA 05U, 2005).   
Based on interviews and literature reviews, End-cost less Other, Shipbuilder Cost and 
Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) contain cost categories that may be density-
driven and were thus investigated for a positive relationship. 
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The Shipbuilder Costs segment is the sum of the following categories for 
the P-5 budget report: 
 Basic Construction,  
 Change Orders, and  
 Escalation.  
Recall that Basic Construction includes all allowable shipbuilder direct labor, indirect 
labor (overhead), and material costs required to construct the ship, plus an amount for 
shipbuilder cost of money and profit; Change Orders includes those dollars required to 
fund necessary changes after the shipbuilding contract is awarded; and Escalation is the 
cost to be paid to the shipbuilder for the effects of inflation over the long ship 
construction period (NAVSEA 05U, 2005).  Cost data that contributed to the Shipbuilder 
Costs element calculations were normalized using the Labor Midpoint as the base date. 
The Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) segment is the sum of 
Electronics, HM&E, Propulsion and Ordinance categories of the P-5 budget report.  
Recall that Electronics includes production components, training support equipment, 
sonars, towed arrays, combat systems, external communications, satellite navigation and 
communication equipment, integrated command and control (C2) communication 
equipment, integrated C2 systems, computers and displays, test and engineering services, 
and repair parts associated with installation. HM&E includes items such as interior 
communications, inertial navigation systems, deep submergence systems, periscopes, 
small boats, inflatable life boats, special vehicles, environmental protection equipment, 
training support equipment, repair parts associated with the installation of HM&E 
equipment, propulsion equipment (non-nuclear), electric generator and motor equipment, 
and all medical equipment provided by BUMED. Propulsion includes turbines, gears, and 
nuclear propulsion reactors and associated equipment; and Ordinance includes fire- and 
missile-control systems, search radars, missile-launching systems, gun systems, training 
support equipment, test and integration services and other ordnance equipment 
(NAVSEA 05U, 2005).  Cost data that contributed to the GFE element were normalized 
using the Material Midpoint as the base date. 
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As mentioned previously, the Other segment is a convenient catch-all of 
miscellaneous but important categories of an end-cost estimate—including Test and 
Instrumentation (T&I),  Stock Shore-based Spares and Other Support.  Although each 
ship will bear some T&I costs, the majority of the T&I costs for a class of ships are 
charged to the lead ship. These costs include government-responsible testing and 
instrumentation incident to routine or special trials leading to qualifying a ship for active 
service.  The Stock Shore-based Spares funded in this category are back-up spares for 
stock ashore or aboard tender/repair ships. Stock spares funded by SCN are limited to 
first-of-its-kind installations on the lead ship. In other cases, shore-based spares are 
funded in the OPN or WPN Appropriation. Specific policy is outlined in NAVSEA 
Instruction 4400.03A.  There are a number of programmatic efforts funded by the PM 
with funds set aside in the Other Support category. Some of the efforts that are  
visible in most end-cost estimates are as follows: 
 Planned Maintenance Subsystem (PMS): Installed aboard ship. Identifies 
the servicing and maintenance requirements of major ship systems or 
subsystems. 
 SUPSHIPS Material or Services: The Navy has O&MN-funded 
SUPSHIPS offices at major private shipbuilding yards to provide on-site 
Navy management and contracting services. Specific tasks requested by 
PMs for SCN shipbuilding programs are funded in this category. In 
addition, other similar Navy-support Activities may be tasked and funded 
by the Other Support category. 
 Contractor-support Services: Separately contracted for services required 
by the PM to fulfill program management responsibilities. 
 Travel: Travel by Naval Activities (personnel) in direct support of 
shipbuilding. Excludes travel costs of NAVSEA Headquarters and those 
activities that are mission-funded—such as SUPSHIPS, which are funded 
with operating funds. 
 Commissioning Ceremony: Costs directly related to the Commissioning 
Ceremony (over and above shipbuilder costs included in basic 
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construction) are funded in this category.  These tasks and other similar 
tasks constitute the efforts in the Other Support category.  
2. Hours Data 
The man-hours required to perform the detailed design for each submarine class 
and then to produce the submarines within each class were used to determine how density 
may relate to producibility.  NAVSEA 05C provided detailed design and production 
hours data for the Ohio, Los Angeles, Seawolf and Virginia Classes.  For submarine 
classes prior to the Ohio Class, accurate man-hours data were not obtainable.   
Based upon interviews with engineers and naval architects at NAVSEA 05U,  as 
well as interviews with previous and current project managers, it became apparent that 
the method of detailed design hours data collection for the Ohio and Los Angeles Class 
submarine classes differed from the man-hours accounting practices employed during the 
Seawolf and Virginia Class procurement efforts.  Many, perhaps as much as half of the 
hours required to complete the detailed design effort for the Ohio and Los Angeles 
Classes, were not specifically accounted for because at that time, a high percentage of 
detailed design was mission-funded.  The portion of the detailed design effort that 
occurred within a mission-funded environment did not require the same hours accounting 
methods as does work performed by a government contractor. As submarine detailed 
design and procurement shifted toward private government contractors, the need for 
thorough and accurate hours data has increased; indeed, current accounting methods 
ensure hours data is sufficient and consistent for comparative study. The differences in 
hours accounting was considered when comparing the detailed design hours data for 
earlier submarines to the data for more recent designs.   
An additional difference in the accounting for design hours and production labor 
hours was accounted for based on a peculiarity of the Virginia Class procurement effort.  
The detailed design contract for the first Virginia Class submarine (SSN 774) included 
non-recurring production man-hours referred to as “Design to Innovation” (D-I).  D-I 
consists of construction tasks that are budgeted and performed during the execution of the 
detail design contract (NAVSEA 05U, 2005). D-I hours were subtracted from the total 
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detailed design hours and added to the SSN-774 production hours to make Virginia Class 
detailed design hours analogous to those of the Seawolf Class, and to make Virginia 
Class production hours analogous to the other three classes of submarine for which 
production hours data were available. 
3. Design Data 
Submarine design data were provided by NAVSEA 05U, NGSB and GD/EB.   
Additional design data were retrieved from documentation available via open sources.  
Design data were used to derive density measurements for submarines. These 
measurements act as a proxy for how tightly systems and equipment are placed within the 
submarine hull.  
a. Weights 
Weight management and accounting are critical to successful submarine 
design.  Given the importance of achieving a specific end-weight for a given volume and 
the importance of ensuring a dynamically stable design, the weight data maintained for 
various submarines designs is all-inclusive and highly accurate.  Weight data provided by 
NAVSEA 05U were broken down according to standard Ship Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) groups.  The weights of Lead Ballast, Variable Ballast and Main Ballast were also 
provided.  Table 2 provides a summary of the submarine weight breakdown provided by 
NAVSEA 05U.    
 52
Table 2.    Standard Submarine Weight Groups  
 
Group 100 Hull Structure 
Group 200 Propulsion Machinery 
Group 300 Electric Plant 
Group 400 Command and Surveillance 
Group 500 Auxiliaries 
Group 600 Outfit and Furnishings 
Group 700 Weapons Systems 
 
  net Σ :   Condition A-1 
 
Displacement Correction Lead 
Stability or Trim Lead 
Margin Lead   
   
net Σ :  Condition A 
 




  net Σ :  Condition N Surfaced  
 
Net Main Ballast Tanks 
 
Total  Σ: Condition N Submerged 
 
b. Volumes 
Volume data were provided by NAVSEA 05U.  Volume data were 
provided in cubic feet and were broken down by major compartment—the sum of which 





Permeability data were provided by GD/EB and by NAVSEA 05U.  The 
data were broken down by major compartment.  NAVSEA 05U provided Permeability 
values broken down by major compartment and the overall Permeability percentage for 
each submarine Class under consideration. 
D. DENSITY CALCULATIONS  
The overall weight density of each submarine (when submerged) is an insufficient 
proxy for density for use in this research because Archimedes’ Principle requires the 
densities of all submarines (when submerged) to achieve densities equal to that of water.  
The primary goal of each density calculation derived was to arrive at the best means to 
represent how compactly the systems and installed equipment have been placed within 
each submarine design.  The derived density measurements were evaluated against their 
perceived theoretical relevance based on reviews of literature pertaining to submarine 
design and interviews with naval architects, engineers, cost estimators, program 
managers and acquisition professionals.  Of all the methods considered, Arc-permeability 
and Internal Density possess defendable theoretical bases for use as proxies for design 
complexity.  These terms are defined and developed below. 
1. Internal Density 
The general philosophy of modern U.S. Naval submarine design has been to 
utilize single-hull construction and to minimize the types and quantity of equipment 
mounted external to the pressure hull.  Additionally, the items mounted external to the 
pressure hull tend to be of similar type and quantity (Secondary Propulsion Motor (SPM), 
anchor and anchor chain, towed arrays, etc.).  For these reasons, the derivation of an 
internal submarine density was deemed an appropriate means to compare U.S. submarine 
designs.  Some exceptions to this general principle exist that have caused the six 
submarines being considered to fall into one of three categories.  First, the George 
Washington and Ohio classes are ballistic missile submarines and contain a large missile 
compartment amidship that the fast-attack submarines lack.  Second, the Sturgeon and 
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early Los Angeles Classes are fast-attack submarines but lack the Vertical Launch Sytem 
(VLS) and Wide Aperture Arrays (WAA) common to the Seawolf, Virginia and later Los 
Angeles Classes.  Third, in addition to some external components, the Seawolf and 
Virginia Classes represent a transition toward increasingly modular construction. This 
study considered this natural grouping when evaluating the observed cost vs. Internal 
Density relationships.  It should be noted that while a comparison of internal densities 
may be appropriate for the available submarine data set under consideration, such 
comparison may not be appropriate for data that includes a mix of single- and double-
hulled submarines, submarines designed according to different design philosophies, or 
submarines utilizing various propulsion methods.   
 





The numerator of the Internal Density calculation should include the weight of 
items that contribute to the consumption of available interior volume of the submarine 
hull.  The denominator is the interior molded volume of the pressure hull.  The weight of 
interior systems and equipment was approximated as the Condition A-1 weight less 
Group 100 (Hull Structure), which is the sum of Groups 200 through 700 weights. 
 





An alternate means of expressing the Internal Density values for each submarine 
is in terms of Internal Specific Gravity.  Specific Gravity is defined as the ratio of the 
density of a given substance to the density of water. 
&weight of interior systems equipmentInternal Density
volumeof submarine interior
=









A principal goal of this research has been to discover and exploit design 
parameters that have been accurately recorded and/or could be accurately calculated from 
recorded data, but have been overlooked by cost estimators, program managers, decision 
makers or appropriators to judge the cost effectiveness of a design.  Indeed, a parameter 
suitable for revealing the cost of density would ideally be a parameter that has not been 
managed as an indirect means to manage cost.  Once a design parameter has been 
identified as a cost-driver and adopted as an independent cost variable, further correlation 
between that parameter and cost should be treated as suspect due to its ability to become 
artificially derived.   
A contractor aware of a parametric relationship in use may understand that cost 
concessions are accepted with less resistance prior to reaching the expected cost per 
parameter target, while any justifications for cost growth above said target are likely to 
receive additional scrutiny.  This self-fulfilling prophesy effect can render a parametric 
cost relationship devoid of the theoretical basis on which the initial correlation was based.   
Permeability is a design parameter that appears to have escaped the scrutiny of 
top-level policy- and decision-makers, yet contains the information necessary to 
investigate the relationship between density and cost.  Permeability represents the volume 
percentage of a submarine compartment not occupied by items.  It is essentially the ratio 
of the molded volume of the hull to the floodable volume.  Permeability values are used 
in stability calculations to predict changes in trim during a flooding casualty if a 
compartment was breeched and the permeable space filled with water. A permeability of 
60% would mean that 40% of the molded volume was occupied by equipment 
(components, piping, wiring, joinerwork, structure, etc.).  
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Permeability data were provided by GD/EB Shipbuilding in Groton, CT, for the 
following submarine classes and are based on calculations performed at GD/EB: 
 USS Sturgeon (SSN 637) 
 USS Ohio (SSBN 726) 
 USS Seawolf (SSN 21) 
 USS Virginia (SSN 774) 
Permeability values were reported according to the following major compartments as 
applicable: 
 Forward Compartment (FWD) 
 Control 
 Missile Compartment 
 Reactor Compartment (Rx) 
 Auxiliary Machinery Room (AMR) 
 Engine Room (ER) 
Design records maintained by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) are 
another source of permeability data.  Chapter 5 includes a recommendation that future 
efforts to quantify the density/cost relationship or develop compensated gross tonnage 
(cgt) factors for naval vessels include this and any additional sources of permeability 
data.  The permeability data provided by GD/EB are sufficient to begin to reveal the 
suitability of using permeability data to underpin the effects of density on cost. 
 It is desirable that the parameter used as a proxy for density be directly 
proportional to density.  However, permeability is inversely proportional to density.  As 
density increases, permeability decreases. Arc-permeability is the term developed for this 
research to refer to the volume percentage of items within a molded volume and contains 







Arc-permeability Factor definition: 
 
  
Arc-permeability Factor calculation: 
 
 
A composite Arc-permeability Factor (APF) was calculated by calculating the 
weighted average APF for the combined Forward Compartment (FWD) and Engine 
Rooms (ER) in order to compare analogous portions of each submarine for which arc-
permeability data were provided.  The composite Arc-permeability Factor (APF) was 









The combined FWD and ER APF excludes the Reactor Compartment (Rx) from all four 
submarines and the Missile Compartment from the Ohio Class thus enabling a 
comparison of analogous portions of each submarine class. 
( )ArcPermeability Factor APF percentage of compartment occupied by items=
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The following cost and hours segments were regressed against Internal Density 
and APF(FWD+ER): 
 Shipbuilder Cost (CY07$) per Long Ton 
 Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) (CY07$) per Long Ton 
 End-cost less Other (CY07$) per Long Ton 
 Detailed Design Hours per Long Ton 
 Production Hours per Long Ton 
Observations on the above results are included in Chapter IV.   
Where data were available, values for the first and the fifth ship built at GD/EB 
are plotted.  Submarines constructed at a common shipyard were used to control for 
differences among the various shipyards that have and currently build submarines.   
The Virginia Class is being built under a teaming relationship between NGSB and 
GD/EB, where each shipyard constructs roughly one half of each submarine, and the 
shipyards take turns acting as the lead yard and performing the final fabrication.  This 
causes an anomaly unique to Virginia Class data and is discussed in the results section.  
For the Virginia Class data, submarines where GD/EB acted as the lead shipyard (SSNs 
774,776,778,780) are used to project values for the fifth GD/EB-led Virginia Class 
submarine (SSN 782). 
Three Seawolf Class submarines were built prior to the cancellation of the 
Seawolf program.  Additionally, the third in the Seawolf Class, the USS Jimmy Carter 
(SSN-23) was a longer version of the USS Seawolf (SSN 21) and USS Connecticut (SSN 





This section presents the results of investigating density as approximated by 
Internal Density and Arc-permeability versus the relevant cost and hours segments.  It is 
evident from the data and supported by expert opinion that the submarine designs being 
considered fall into three natural groupings based on a combination of submarine type, 
capability (driven largely by level of acoustic quieting), and acquisition environment 
(production rate, vendor base, etc.).  The natural groupings are as follows: 
 Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)—George Washington (GW) and Ohio 
classes. 
 Early Fast-attack Submarines (SSNs)—Sturgeon, Los Angeles (LA) and 
Improved Los Angeles (LA – I) Classes. 
 Recent Fast-attack Submarines (SSNs)—Seawolf and Virginia Classes. 
The data support the theories presented in Chapter II.  As with the mass 
dispersion analysis performed by Sedler on the component level, there seems to be some 
range of density for which cost per unit weight is minimized.  Also, current design 
philosophies appear to be forcing submarine designs away from the optimum.  The 
concave curves drawn on the following charts are notional.  They represent a family of 
such curves of the same shape that could be drawn higher or lower based on submarine 
type, capability level, and acquisition environment. 
A. SHIPBUILDER COST 
The first and fifth GD/EB ship shipbuilder cost per long ton (CY07$) versus 
internal density (pounds per cubic foot) are shown in Figure 12.  The first and fifth 
GD/EB ship Shipbuilder Cost per long ton (CY07$) versus combined Ops Compartment 
& Engine Room Arc-permeability (percent) are shown in Figure 13.  Of note is the fact 
that the first GD/EB “Improved” Los Angeles Class submarine (SSN 751) cost more than 
the first GD/EB Los Angeles Class submarine (SSN 690).  This data does not correct for 
the fact that a large percentage of the “Improved” Los Angeles design was mature (up to 
 60
60%) and unchanged in SSN-751.  Such a correction would increase the shipbuilder cost 
for the “Improved” Los Angeles Class and further underscore the point being made that 
the increased density of the “Improved” Los Angeles Class required additional 
shipbuilder effort per long ton to produce. 
The first Virginia Class submarine cost less per long ton than the first Seawolf 
Class submarine.  This is significant because the Virginia Class is the first fast-attack 
submarine design to break the trend of increasing shipbuilder costs per long ton with each 
subsequent design.  It is also the first submarine to break a similar trend of increasing 
density with each subsequent design.    
The simulated fifth GD/EB-led Virginia Class submarine actually incurred more 
shipbuilder cost than the first.  This is caused by the significant re-design effort enacted 
to bring down submarine costs as a whole.  Both the first and the simulated fifth Virginia 
Class submarines’ costs are also inflated due to the multiple-contractor teaming effort 
employed to preserve the industrial base for designing and building submarines.  
Theoretical first and fifth Virginia Classes are shown in grey that have been corrected for 
the anomalies mentioned previously that are unique to the Virginia Class procurement 
effort.    
There is a significant decrease between the shipbuilder costs per long ton for the 
first and simulated fifth Seawolf Class submarines.  This is evidence of the “first-in-class 
performance drop-off” phenomenon that suggests excessively dense designs increase the 
complexity and cost risk of a design; these, then, increase the quantity and intesify the 
severity of problems encountered in the initial build effort. In short, they ultimately 
translate to increased first-ship costs.  
The fifth George Washington and fifth Ohio Class submarines may be 
demonstrating that unnecessarily low densities may also cause one design to be more 
expensive to build than another.  If so, this would lend credence to the mass dispersion 
theory and represent a practical example of the quote by Albert Einstein, “Everything 




Figure 12.   First and Fifth Ship Shipbuilder Cost per Long Ton (CY07$) versus 
Internal Density (pounds per cubic foot) 
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B. GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE)  
The first and fifth GD/EB ship Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) costs per 
long ton (CY07$) versus Internal Density (pounds per cubic foot) are shown in Figure 
14.  The first and fifth GD/EB ship Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) per long ton 
(CY07$) versus combined Ops Compartment & Engine Room Arc-permeability (percent) 
are shown in Figure 15.  This investigation of GFE costs demonstrates that density not 
only affects the costs associated with building a submarine, but it also influences the cost 
of the parts and materials with which it is built. 
The large reduction in GFE cost between the first and simulated fifth Virginia 
Class submarines is an example of the cost reductions possible when product and process 
improvements are directed toward lowering costs.  Instead of using product and process 
improvements to improve the amount of capability in a given volume or to provide the 
same capability in a smaller space, such improvements have been directed toward 
offering the same capability in the same space for less cost.  The goal to reduce the cost 
of a Virginia Class submarine to $2 billion (CY05$) has aligned the actions of those 
involved to produce a contributive, vice a canceling effect.   
The GFE costs for the first George Washington Class, as shown in Figure 14, 
have been reduced by subtracting a large non-recurring ordinance investment that was 




Figure 14.   First and Fifth Ship Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) per Long 
Ton (CY07$) versus Internal Density (pounds per cubic foot) 
 
 
Figure 15.   First and Fifth Ship Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) per Long 













































































Government-furnished Equipment (GFE) (CY07$) / Long Ton vs. Internal Density 





The first and fifth GD/EB ship End-cost less Other per long ton (CY07$) versus 
Internal Density (pounds per cubic foot) are shown in Figure 16.  The first and fifth 
GD/EB ship End-cost less Other per long ton (CY07$) versus combined Operations 
Compartment & Engine Room Arc-permeability (percent) are shown in Figure 17.  The 
combined effect of shipbuilder costs and GFE as represented by “End-cost less Other” 






Figure 16.   First and Fifth Ship End-cost Less Other per Long Ton (CY07$) versus 
Internal Density (pounds per cubic foot) 
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D. DETAILED DESIGN HOURS 
The detailed Design Hours per long ton (CY07$) versus Internal Density (pounds 
per cubic foot) are shown in Figure 18.  The Detailed Design Hours versus combined 
Ops Compartment & Engine Room Arc-permeability (percent) are shown in Figure 19.  
The Ohio and Los Angeles Classes’ data are shown—adjusted for differences in detailed 
design man-hours accounting methods previously mentioned.   As suspected, increasingly 
dense designs require more time to design, which leads to increased costs.  This is likely 




Figure 18.   Detailed Design Hours per Long Ton (CY07$) versus Internal Density 
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Figure 19.   Detailed Design Hours versus Arc-permeability (percent) 
E. PRODUCTION HOURS 
The first and fifth GD/EB-built ship Production Hours per long ton versus 
Internal Density (pounds per cubic foot) are shown in Figure 20.  The first and fifth 
GD/EB-built ship Production Hours versus combined Ops Compartment & Engine Room 
Arc-permeability (percent) are shown in Figure 21.  
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Figure 20.   First and Fifth Ship Production Hours per Long Ton versus Internal 




Figure 21.   First and Fifth Ship Production Hours versus Arc-permeability (percent)   
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Cost and Performance Risk are Asymmetric 
The submarine diameter is fixed very early in any submarine design effort, which 
makes submarine length the only parameter that can be adjusted when volume increases 
are deemed necessary.  Such design changes are costly, cause cascading effects and drive 
the submarine design away from its hydrodynamically optimal shape.  Also, scarce 
volume leads to unanticipated increases in complexity, density and system 
interdependence—increasing the likelihood of a “first-of-class performance drop-off” and 
higher costs throughout the life cycle.  For these reasons, the cost, schedule and 
performance risk associated with undercalling the eventual volume required to execute a 
successful submarine design is greater than the cost, schedule and performance risk 
associated with producing a submarine design that is ultimately deemed unnecessarily 
large. 
2. Weight Reduction Increases Cost 
The net effect of an overreliance on weight as a cost driver has led to the 
employment of weight and size limits as means to reduce costs, often producing the 
opposite effect.  First, weight and size constraints encourage the use of unnecessary 
tolerances, unique parts, engineered materials, and weight-optimized designs.  These tend 
to have a negative impact on life cycle costs.  Second, the next 40 years of shrinking 
electronics—as predicted by Moore’s Law—are unlikely to translate to an exploitable 
inventory of space and weight margins in the same way they have historically.  Finally, 
adding global constraints to an already complex design effort limits the designer’s ability 
to allocate the space and weight required to realize a cost-efficient design and to properly 
exploit the advantages provided by modular systems and construction methods, open 
architecture and commercial off-the-shelf products.   
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3. Density and Cost Exhibit a Family of U-shaped Curves  
Internal Density and Arc-permeability reveal a U-shaped relationship between 
density and cost.  Instead of one curve, a family of curves is assumed.  Submarine 
designs will occupy a particular curve based on the combined effect of design 
specification, production rate and acquisition environment. Increased capability, reduced 
production rate and a less favorable acquisition environment will cause the density/cost 
curve to shift upward.  Opposite trends will cause the curve to shift downward.  Weight-
optimized designs will result in submarine densities that will incur costs above minimum 
attainable according to the density versus cost theory.  The Virginia Class design effort 
was a step in the right direction, but downward pressure on weight and size prevented it 
from reaching the optimal density corresponding to the opportunity for lowest costs.   
4. Density Management Alone will not Reduce Costs  
A determination to manage density as an indirect means to manage cost is the 
wrong conclusion to draw from the density/cost relationship.  Such a simplistic approach 
will lead to all the undesirable behavior and cost outcomes observed when weight or size 
has been managed as an indirect means to cost.  Appropriate conclusions to be drawn 
from an understanding of the density/cost relationship are discussed in the following 
section. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. For the Program Head  
Density measurements, to include Internal Density and Arc-permeability, 
provide the means to develop compensated gross tonnage (cgt) factors for naval 
vessels.  Without a means to compare ships of various sizes and levels of complexity, one 
cannot say with any certainty if acquisition programs are increasingly broken or 
improving.  Better analogies lead to more defendable cost estimates, more predictable 
outcomes and an increased understanding of the true state of a program.  Better analogies 
also reveal which product and process improvements are producing their desired effect. 
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2. For the Cost Estimator  
An analysis of density as it relates to cost reveals the asymmetric pressure 
initial sizing decisions exert in terms of cost and performance risk and the pressure 
that density exerts on the ultimate cost per unit weight of a design.  A design that is 
deemed “too small” for its contents was more costly to design, construct, change, 
maintain and upgrade.  It is inherently inflexible and may mandate unacceptable 
capability concessions.  A design that is deemed “too big” for its contents was simpler to 
design, construct, change, maintain and upgrade.  It is more flexible, and the penalties in 
speed, acceleration and overall performance are likely acceptable.   
3. For Congress and the Secretariat   
Adding constraints such as weight limits to an already complex design effort 
as a means to reduce costs will likely produce the opposite effect.  Cost-estimating 
models and algorithms only allow the cost estimator to perform cost estimates more 
expeditiously.  The parameters used in parametric cost estimates should not be extracted 
and managed as an indirect means to manage cost. As complex and interdependent the 
interactions between a vessel and its contents are, any arbitrary constraint can only serve 
to artificially and unnecessarily limit the ability of designers to achieve the best design 
from a performance per life cycle cost perspective.   
4. For the Program Executive   
A deliberately crafted, clearly stated and carefully guarded acquisition 
strategy and systems engineering approach must exist throughout each 
procurement effort if lower costs are to be realized.  Such a clear vision can only be 
maintained by a single empowered individual who is solely responsible for the ultimate 
success or failure of the procurement process as a whole.  No design size, production rate, 
vendor base, level of competition or even design density should be viewed as inherently 
low cost.   Recall that product and process improvements can typically be exploited in 
only one of the following ways: 
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1. Increase the amount of capability in the same volume,  
2. Reduce the volume required to offer the same capability, or  
3. Provide the same capability in the same volume at a lower cost. 
Density trends show that well-intentioned individuals acting independently will err 
towards one and two over the third.  Therefore, if lower costs are the goal, the acquisition 
strategy must explicitly demand cost savings be extracted as each cost-saving opportunity 
presents itself. 
5. For the Design-Build Team 
Density reduction may represent a low-cost means to achieve the right mix of 
design flexibility, capability, reliability and maintainability from a life cycle cost 
perspective.  The deliberate and aggressive implementation of space and weight margins 
may be necessary to ensure a submarine can remain relevant throughout the design life of 
its hull as rates of technological change and volatility in the threat environment dictate 
the need for increased flexibility in future submarine designs.  Additionally, the potential 
cost effectiveness of a less dense design gives the lifecycle cost advocate a powerful 
voice.  Finally, the cost-saving potential and flexibility of modular designs, open 
architecture systems and commercial off-the-shelf products are realizable only when 
given adequate space for their proper implementation.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research effort served to reveal the growing inadequacies of weight-based 
cost-estimating techniques and the undesirable secondary effects that are likely when cost 
drivers are managed as an indirect means to manage cost.  Perhaps for the first time, a 
relationship between submarine density and cost was demonstrated showing that density 
may indeed represent a previously underemphasized, if not unexplained, driver of historic 
submarine cost-growth in excess of inflation.   
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Much more could be done to prove the concept of density as a cost driver and to 
further quantify the results.  The following are recommendations for further research that 
could build on the theoretical bases and preliminary conclusions contained herein.   
 Derive compensated gross tonnage (cgt) factors for military ships and submarines. 
 Further explore and attempt to quantify the relationship between submarine 
density and cost. 
 Consider additional means of measuring submarine density. 
 Develop density measurements for military surface ships, aircraft and vehicles. 
 Evaluate space and weight margin policies and consider their continued relevance 
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APPENDIX A.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Subject: Questions in support of thesis research. 
 




1) In your view, what have been the primary sources of ship/submarine cost escalation 
for the past several decades? 
 
2) How has the complexity of submarines evolved? What metrics do you think 
capture best the evolution in the complexity of submarines (e.g., power generation, 
weapons onboard, number of support equipment, area of regard, LSW, power 
density, size, other)? 
 
3) In your opinion, are there any design specifications, tolerances, constraints and/or 
design philosophies that tend to drive up the cost of submarines without a 
corresponding and adequate increase in safety, capability or reliability?  
 
4) Can you cite any specific examples/studies in which a larger submarine component 
could be designed and produced more affordably than a comparably functioning 
component whose only difference is that it has been scaled down in size and/or 
customized to fit in a particular location? 
 
5) Are there any disincentives in how the government procures ships/submarines that 
may lead to cost growth? Are there any initiatives that the government can 
encourage to reduce the cost of future ships (e.g., multiyear acquisition, lean 
production, open architecture, modularity, contractual incentives for cost 
reduction)? 
 
6) Should more or less effort/investment be made into designing ships and submarines 
that are capable of adapting to the technological advances and migrating threats of 
the future?  How do you balance such investment with the necessary sacrifices in 
current capability that would accompany such investment? 
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